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Or.En. 

At its sitting of 11 October 1982, the European Parliament 
referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Purvis and Mr Seligman 
CDoc. 1-653/82> pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure to the 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology as the committee responsible 
and to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation and the Committee on Transport for an opinion. 
At its meeting of 20 October 1982 the Conmittee on Energy, 
Research and Technology decided to draw up a report, and at its meeting 
of 3 December 1982, it appointed Mr Rogers, rapporteur. 
The Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 
14 June 1983, 25 January and 22 February 1984. At the last meeting it 
adopted the motion for a resolutionunanimously. 
The following were present for the vote: Mr GALLAGHER, 
acting-chairman; Mr SELIGMAN, vice-chairman; Mr IPPOLITO, vice-chairman, 
Mr ROGERS, rapporteur; Mr ADAM, Mr CALVEZ <deputizing for Mr GALLAND), 
Mr FLANAGAN, Mr FUCHS, Mr LINKOHR, Mr MARCHESIN, Mr PURVIS, Mr RINSCHE, 
Mr SALZER, Sir Peter VANNECK, Mr VERONESI, Mrs VIEHOFF (deputizing for 
Mrs LIZIN>. 
The report was tabled on 1 March 1984. 
The opinions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
the Committee on Transport are attache~. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report appears in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it wit I be debated. 
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The Committee on Energy, Research a~d iechnology hereby submits to 
the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on European Community gas policy 
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PURVIS AND 
Mr SELIGMAN CDoc. 1-653/82), 
having regard to its Resolution of 8 February 1982 on Soviet exports 
of natural gas to certain Member States of the European Community1, 
having regard to its Resolution of 11 March 1983 on the methods of 
setting natural gas prices and tariffs in the Community~ 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology and theopinionsof the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the Committee on Transport CDoc. 1-1512/83), 
-having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
3 
concerning natural gas , 
A. whereas the formulation of an energy policy for the European Community 
is a matter of high importance and urgency; 
B. whereas this must include a policy for gas based on an accurate analysis 
of the situation in the Community gas market; 
c. noting the increasing dependence on gas from European coutnries other 
than Member States of the Community; 
D. whereas the Community must not be dependent for its supplies of a major 
energy source on any single exporter or exporting region; 
E. whereas imports of natural gas from third countries are expected to account 
in future for an increasing proportion of the Community gas supplies; 
F. whereas trade in natural gas had special characteristics which complicate 
the development of an international market; 
1 
2Doc. 1-653/82> 
3oJ C66, 15.3.82, p60 
4oJ C99, 11.4.83, p107 Doc. no. not available at time o! 5~riting PE 82.193/ fin. 
G· ~he~eas thP emer,ence of such a market is nev~rt~~less being assisted 
t1 the constructi~n of lcng-distan:e pipelines, by the growth of the 
infrastructure needed for international trade in liquefied natural ga$ 
(LNG) and by the enlargement, modernisation and interconnection of local 
gas d1strib~tior. ;etwcrks; 
H· where the terms o~ which supplies of natural gas are acquired from outside 
the Comm~~ity shcJld realistically reflect the economics of gas production 
and transport; 
1• whereas the terms on which gas is sold within the Community should 
realistically reflect the economics of the production or acquisition of 
gas, of its distribution and of the management of gas reserves; 
1. Considers that the time has come to introduce more order and transparency 
in the gas market in the Community; 
2. Congratulates the Commission on the factual analyses of various aspects 
of the gas situation in the Community which it has provided in its recent 
Communications~ 
3. Takes note, in particular, of the most recent Commission Communication 
on naturaL gas, which gives a satisfactory prognosis for availability and 
security of supplies up to 1990, but highlights the need for the Community 
to start making plans and taking decisions soon to make sure that secure 
sources of supply are open to it by the end of the century; 
4· Endorses the Commission's views on the general strategy to be followed 
with regard to diversification and security of supplies; 
5· Draws attention to the fact that the benefits to the Community of a correct 
strategy with regard to diversification and security of supplies, as well 
as other ~pects of gas production and trade, can be negated if disorderly 
and distorted conditions exist in the internal gas market of the Community; 
6. Believes that the next step is to ensure that such conditions cannot exist; 
I. Requests the Commission accordingly to examine what specific measures the 
Community as such should take, and, where appropriate, what new powers it 
should assume, to ensure that developments in its gas market are consistent 
with the Treaties and with Community energy strategy objectives; 
- 6 - PE 82.:93/fin. 
8· Invites the Commission, in making this study, to consider the scope for 
a Community role in the following areas, among others: 
(a) approving supply contracts concluded with third countries, 
(b) setting criteria to be observed in the management of stocks 
and reserves, and arrangements for storage within the Community, 
(c) the planning of distribution systems and their interconnections, 
<d> drawing up and enforcing rules designed to secure comparability 
and transparency in methods of fixing prices and tariffs, 
(e) encouraging investment, especially in exploration, development~ 
interconnections and gas gathering systems both within and without 
the territory of the European Community, 
(f) harmonising standards for the protection, in connection with the 
use of gas, of persons, property and the natural environment, 
(g) protecting the interests of gas consumers of all categories. 
<h> ensuring the competitivity of gas in the financial consumer market, 
(i) industrial exploration for primaeval gas. 
9. Asks that the Commission study requested in paragraph 6 above should 
(a) give an assurance that conditions in all sectors of the gas market 
in the Community are consistent with the Treaties or are the 
subject of derogations permitted under the terms of specific 
Treaty provisions; 
(b) in the case of any derogations, indicate for how much longer 
these are expected to continue. 
10. Reserves judgment on the details of Community gas policy until the study 
requested from the Commission is available; 
11. Congratulates the European Investment Bank on its work in helping to 
provide finance for infrastructure projects in the gas sector; 
12. - Instructs its President to forward this Resolution together with 
explanatory Statement to the Council and Commission of the European 
Communities, the European Investment Bank and the parliaments and 
governments of the Member States. 
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8 
:XPLANATORY ST~TEMENT 
1. The purpose of this report is to analyse the political issues raised by 
natural gas production, consumption and trade, for the European Community and 
to :ta~e the policy considerations which should guide the Community in its 
delibe~ations on gas matters in the foreseeable futu~e. 
2. The European Parliament has not made a report on the general gas situation 
for a ntll'!lber of years. tnder the irnnediate influence of tr.e 1973 energy crisis, 
Parliament adopted a resolution "on certain prerequisites for future guidelines 
concerning the supply and use of gas in the Cammunity"1 . This was based on a 
re;x>rt by Mr. BOUSCH (Doc. 213/73) . In this resolution, Parliament expressed 
the view that the situation as it was then, and foreseeable developnents in 
the natural gas sector, called for systematic measures on the Community's part 
within the frarrework of the Cammunity energy policy. It saw a need for the 
int:::-oduction, in view of the growing opportunities for importing natural gas, 
of a genuine common commercial policy. It saw a role for derived gas and 
placed the main emphasis here on research into the gasification of coal. 
3. This is a good time to re-examine the role of gas in the energy economy of 
the European Community. We need to know how gas stands in the general context 
of the Community's efforcs to reduce its dependence on imported energy supplies. 
It 1s, after all, botb z; important indigenous energy resource and at the same 
time a commodity that i~. being imported on a Large scale. Second, we need to 
know the position of gas in relation to the whole question of rational use of 
energy. That is to say, we need to be clear in our minds how Large a role gas 
ca~ play in the energy-r-fficient society, and what forms this role can take. 
4. The Commission has published a certain number of documents and proposals on 
gas over the past three vears. There have been Communications on (a) natural 
gas 2, (b) the security of natural gas supplies to the European Community3, and 
(c) on Community natural gas supplies4, as well as a proposal for a Council 
Recommendation on the ~ethods of setting natural gas prices and tariffs in the 
Communitys. 
1
-JJ :-Jc. C l08 cf 10.12.'73, p.21 2
coM (81) 530 final 
3
coM <82) 45 final 
4ccM <82> 655 final 
s __ 
LUM <!2) 603 final 
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5. This proposal on gas prices was the subject of a report drawn up by 
Mr MORELAND on behalf of Parliament's Committee on Energy and Research, which 
was adopted on 11 March 19831. The MORELAND report called for certain 
amendments to the proposed Recommendation, which the Commission subsequently 
accepted. In broad tenns the report welcared the Commission's ideas and said 
develc:pnents in the gas market after adoption of the recamendation should be 
monitored with a view to the possibility of the Commission proposing Community 
legislation in the future. 
6. The occasion for the present report was provided by a Motion for a Resolution 
tabled oy Mr PURVIS and Mr SELIGMAN on a natural gas policy in the European 
Community2 , which was 1nspired by the need for rapid and energetic efforts to 
draw up and implement a common energy policy for natural gas supplies so as to 
avoid over-dependence on any one third-country supplier and in particular the 
Soviet Union. The need for such a common policy had already been expressed in 
a resolution of the European Parliament of 18 February 19823. 
7. Before moving to a discussion on the political aspects of gas policy, 
it will be desirable to summarise the factual background. Accordingly, the 
remainder of this explanatory statement will be divided into two parts: a 
technical section and a political section. 
8. Compared4 with the long history of the use of oil, the gaseous hydrocarbons 
have only come into use recently. The intensive utilization of deposits 
containing solely natural gas has only taken place in the last few decades, 
starting out with the deposits that lie directly adjacent to consumer centres. 
Even now, associated gas arising during recovery of oil remains totally unused 
in some cases. 
------------~- 1-1317/82 
~- 1-653/83 
-9-3oJ c66, 15.3.82, p60 
4 
!1th World Eneray Conference, IV'••nich 1980, 
. ·~ey of Energy Resources 1980, London 1980, p118 
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9. The main reason for the late development of interest in this hign-vaLue 
raw material ties in the relatively difficult problems of transport and storage. 
However, by now the technical problems have been la~gely solved and there is no 
tc~ge~ any fundamental problem of gas mobility. Large-diameter gas pipelines 
~or transporting the gas over considerable, sometimes intercontinental, distances 
are either already in operation or in construction. Additionally, the technology 
cf liquefaction of natural gas has been developed, and this makes it possible to 
~ransport large quantities of gas by ship. In the consumer centres, multiple-
tranch~d pipeline systems are available for gas distribution. Last, the Latest 
advances of technology make it possible to store considerable volumes of natural 
gas in salt domes or porous rock. 
10. During the last 20 years, the utilization of natural gas has seen an 
,:st..ct.<:-:.ding expansion, and without doubt even today has not yet reached its 
peak. The relationship of proved reserves to current production is nearly 
50 : 1 and is thus considerably more favourable than in the case of oil. 
11. Pipeline q~ality gas sold today cy utilities (with a high net calorific 
value of 7,500 to 10,000 kcal/c~ic m;tre or of 850 to 1,100 Etn per cf) can 
be Froduced fran several sources. These can be grouped as follcws1 : 
- Conventional Natural Gas ( NG) , 
- Unconventional Natural Gas (e.g. fran tight sands, Devonian shales, gee-
pressurized fonnations, coal ~eaus, bianass) , 
-- s:ynthetic Natural Gas {SNG) (e.g. fran coal gasification, liquid hydrocarbons). 
12. Alrrost all pipeline gas is produced at present fran conventional gas fields 
and gas associated ·with oil. Although the contribution mace by unconventional 
scurces could became significant around the turn of the centurj, conventional 
gas v-;ill :.:·:mtim~e to daninate the gas picture2 
-10-
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Interr.auc-r.al E:-.ergy F-.genc-.t ( IEJ.. l , ~;:!:!:::E~Lg~~-;.-~;:S?~!~_!9_~QQQ, Paris 1982, p63 
.., 
'output fran t; ght sands a'1d Devoni<...:.!1 shale is often included in conventional 
Frcx~·.xtion bec.:.use of the Ci:fic•Jlty of def:Lning the border line. 
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13.The conventional natural gas which comes directly out of the deposit consists 
of a range of lighter hydrocarbons together with water and irrpurities. The 
carposition of this product varies considerably fran deposit to deposit. The 
major hydrocarbon is rrethane (0!4 ) which constitutes SO - nearly 100% (in the 
case of "rrethane deposits") • Various other hydrocarbons containing greater 
numbers of carbon atans are found to a proportion decreasing as the number of 
carbon atans increases right the way up to hexane (C6H4 ). Sate of these hydro-
carbons are liquids under normal terrperature and pressure. According to the 
composition of the product and the changes that take place in the ther.modynamic 
conditions during the recovery process, sate of these constituents can condense 
out in the above ground seperators as liquids. Such liquids are called gas 
condensates. 
1l; • The proportion of the various irrpuri ties can vary within considerable margins. 
The nost irrportant irtpurities are nitrogen, carbon dioxide, sulphur ccnp:>unds, 
and helium. According to the particular requirements of the user, the product 
must be freed fran these irrpurities in natural gas treatment equi~nt. This is 
particularly irtportant in the case of gases containing appreciable amounts of 
sulphur carpounds (acidic gases) because these carpounds are strongly corrosive 
and can cause difficulties in petrochemical processes (catalyst poisoning). 
15. As definitions of NG-reserves are not uniform throughout the world, . 
we refer in this report to a recently published !FA study1 on natural gas 
dividing NG-reserves into two categories : 
- proved reserves : those reserves which, on the available evidence, 
are potentially productive given current technology and current 
prices; 
- additional reserves : all reserves and potential recoverable 
resources in addition to proved reserves. 
-11-
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16 • Table 1 provides a sumr.ary of oil and gas reserves (proved and additional 
reserves) . Following the IEA-NG study1 , there is general agreercent that 
proved natural gas reserves amount to rrore than 60, 000 Mtoe. However, the 
~stimates of additional recoverable gas reserves vary considerably. This 
· ... lncertainty is due to the rather limited arrount of gas exploration undertaken 
in prospective gas-bearing sedi.Itentary basins outside the major gas-consuming 
countries. The IFA2 has further pointed out that fran 1967 to 1979 world gas 
reserve additions were a.lm:>st four times longer than world cumulative marketed 
production (i.e. cumulative gross production minus gas flared, lost or reinjected}, 
~nereas in the same period world oil reserve additions were only twice as large 
as world ~~~ulative production (and in the latter part of the 1970s annual oil 
reserve additions were even smaller than \\Orld production). Thus the oil 
reserve/production ratio (RP-ratio) fell from 32 years in 1967 to 28 in 1979, 
while the gas RP-ratio increased during the same period fran 37 years to 47 
3 
years . 
17 • Table 2 gives a rrore detailed picture of world gas reserves. 
18. The European OECD countries have a share of only 5~ of total proved 
reserves, whereas 42~ of proved reserves are in developing countries. 
As far as additional gas reserves are concerned <with again a 40~ 
share in developing countries) a high amount is Loc~ted in regions 
4 . 
with hos~ile environments, so that it appears unlikely, as the IEA has 
pointed out, that a major proportion of them will be made available 
to markets over the next two decades. Furthermore, the IEK. pointed 
out, that considerable reserve additions are likely to be found over 
the next two decades, but the adeitions are likely to take place 
chiefly in OPEC and other developing countries, and in centrally 
planned economics. 
--------------1IEA, "t 65 op. c 1 , p • 
2Ibid 
~:bid 
ciEA, op.cit., p67 
,..Ibid 
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19. When considering the gas reserves mentioned above one has to take 
into account that these gas reserves may be either associated or 
non-associated. Non-associated ga; is found in reservoirs where it 
may come into contact with water, but not with oil. Its production 
is discretionary, in the sense that it can be shut in and remain 
undeveloped until the economic climate warrants commercialisation. 
Associated gas, on the other hand, is not discretionary because it is 
produced in association with crude oil. Unless there is a market 
for the associated gas, it must be either reinjected for reservoir 
pressure maintenance or flared. 
20. The purpose of reinjection is to maximise the recovery of oil from 
a reservoir. It also has the effect, however, of allowing producing 
countries to postpone the decision on how ultimately to use the 
associated gas, SOX of which may be recoverable after oil production 
ceases. There are, however, limits to the amount of gas that can 
be reinjected depending upon the specific conditions of a given reservoir. 
The remainder, in the absence of a gas-gathering system, will be flared. 
Although the amount of gas per unit of oil varies considerably, 
estimates have been made of the gross availability of associated gas. 
On the basis of figures from 19 oil-producing countries which accounted 
for 45% of world oil production, the Wo~ld Energy Conference estimated 
an average gas to oil ratio (GOR) of 160 cubic metres of gas per cubic 
metre of crude oil. The estimate of remaining recoverable oil is 
about 360 bern, implying estimated associated gas of 57,000 bern, while 
proved oil reserves of 70 bcm imply associated gas of about 11,200 bern. 
Associated, gas reserves are heavily concentrated in the Middle East and 
Africa where they account for a larger proportion of total gas reserves 
than in other parts of the world. 
21. As was shown in Table 2 the RP-ratio indicated that proved natural 
gas reserves would last 46 years ; but these ratios are "static 
lifetime", so that they do not take into account either changes in 
production or additions ro proved reserves. When taking into account 
that a high percentage of "additional reserves" are most likely to 
be exploitable economically in the future, it is obvious that the 
natural gas resource base can easily support a considerable expansion 
of world gas production and trade. The major question, however, is 
whether the economic and political climate will allow the development 
of these resources. 
1reA, op.cit., p67 -13-
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22. ~r~r. . .,sicering ,:as reserv~s and re$ources one must also take into account 
the potential contribut~on from unconventional and synthetic gas. Limited 
prod~ction of unccnvent1onal gas takes place already today (about 25 bern, 
comca~ec with a natural gas world production in 1980 of about 1500 bcm). The 
., 
IEA' stresses that the contribution from these sources will not significantly 
alter ti'e energy situation of the 1980's. Towards the turn of the century, 
however, prcduction may reach 280 bcm provided a vigorous R & 0 effort is made, 
backe~ bv favourable regulatory and fiscal policies. Recent retrenchments in 
inoustrial countries in supporting R & D and construction of pilot and 
demor.straticn p~ants, ccmbined with temporarily falling world oil prices and 
~i~h ~ntere~t rates which undercut private sector investment incentives, raise 
serious ~oubts as to whether the upper ends of the ranges for production levels 
of unconventional gas supplies are likely to be acM1eved2• 
23. Table 3 gives an overviev.; of the natural gas world proouction level 
from 197~ to 1982. Total.world producticn increased fran 1053 bern 
in 1970, to 1504 b'm in 1980 and to 1530 in 1982 (i.e. an average annual 
growth rate between 1970 and 1980 of 3.6%). It is obvious that the 
United States is still the most important producer of natural gas in 
the world, but its total share of world production declined signifi-
cantly from 59% in 1970 to 32.5% in 1982. -On the other hand, the USSR 
I 
the second most import~t producer, expan~ its production considerably 
and reached 1982 with 32.77-ot total world production- nearly the us-
production level • EC production, however, amounted in 1982 only 




24. A nore detailed description for 1970, 1981 and 1982 of tt.~ EC's and , 
i ~s me.T.l:;e.::- s1:ates' energy si t·.•ation in general, and of prod.'.lc1:ion, 
consumption and net imports of natural gas in particular is provided in 
Table 4. The total production of primary energy in the EC <=Eur 9) 
rose significantly from 328 mtoe in 1970 to 486 Mtoe in 1982, but 
NG-production increased more rapidly, so that NGaccounted for 23.5% 
of total EC {=EUR 9> energy production in 1982 <compared with only 
18.7% in 1970>. The main NG produce~ in the EC are the Netherlands 
followed by the UK and Germany. As far as gross inland energy 
consumption is concerned the percentage of NG in the EC C=EUR 9> 
increased considerably from 1970 to 1982 (from 7.4% to 18.2%), but 
compared with oil and even with coal NG is sti~of minor importance. 
Only in the Netherlands,as the dominant NG producer in the EC, is 
energy consumption mainly based on NG (percentage of NG in 1982 
was 49.2%). 
25. Finally, Table 4 shuws that in 1982 only 10.9% of total net energy 
imports were NG imports, thus again revealing the EC's hi9h oil 
dependency~ 
26 • Table 5 summarises some important g-as economy indicators· for the EC 
<=ECU 10> as a whole. It is clear that natural gas dominates:other types of 
gas, and that this witt continue. Its percentage share of inland ccnsu~otion has 
risen significantly since 1970 and accounted for more than 90% in 1982. Other 
gases Ccoal-oven gas, blast-furnace gas, ~orks gas> are now of minor importance. 
27. As Table 5 shows, private househotds have considerably increased their 
respective share in natural gas consumption, so that in 198a-48.7% of total NG 
consumed in the EC was delivered to this sector. 
28. finally, Table 5 reveats the EC 1 s increased dependence on imported gas, 
as the substantial increase of NG consumption in the EC since 1970 could not be 
provided exclusively from indigenous gas. (Its share in total NG gas consumption 
in the EC dropped from 97.9% in 1970 to 70.5% in 1982.> Natural gas from third 
countries was mainly delivered by Norway and the USSR C~ith respective shares 
of 13.9Xand 11.6% of total NG consumption in the EC in 1982). 
-15-
PE 82.193/fin. 
·rhe future of NG: Its role in a Community energy strategy and its 
(1v) -----------------------------------------------------------------prospective share in future total energy consumption. 
----------------------------------------------------
29. To face the energy challenge for the European Community the Council 
passed two resolutions - in 1974 and 1980 1 - setting Community 
energy objectives. The- main features were a reduction in oil depen-
dence through the more rational use of energy and a broader diver-
sification of energy supply. The Commission, however, pointed out2 
that these Council Resolutions have not led to the implementation of 
an overall strategy comprising action by the Community, Member States 
and producers and consumers; and the inadequacy and inconsistency of 
the action taken in the wake of these expressions of political will 
can only be dePlored. 
30. In order to face the serious energy challenge and to develop a frame-
work for action allowing the Community to respond more effectively 
and without harmful delay to the problems which the energy question 
raises now and in the future, the Commission presented a report3 
in October 19!1 for the "Development of an Energy Strategy for the 
Community". 
31. In this report the Commission pointed out that NG has become over the 
past fifteen years an important element in the energy balance of the 
Member States, making a useful contribution to the diversification 
of supply and thus to a reduction in oil ~ependence. Maintenance of 
this trend however, as the Commission pointed out further, poses a 
number of problems as regards security of deliveries, coordination 
of investments and coherence in pricing policy. 
32. In the framework of this "Energy Strategy for the Community;', which 
is not yet however adopted by the Council,' NG is expected to play 
a more important role in the future and to increase its share in 
• total energy consumption considerably. This general tendency is also 
in accordance with the national energy objectives in the Member States. 
-16-
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33. ln order to allow NG to play a more important role in the future, 
there are two main problems, which have to been resolvP.d. These two 
main problems, which __ ~_onf_r.<?._n~ ~he gas tndustry in the Community, and 
-- - - .. - .... 
34. 
which are likely to become more acute in the futur~ are price develop-
ments and the security of supplies. In its latest proposals1 for 
Council Resolutions concerning NG the Commission suggested various 
measures to improve the security of natural gas supplies; these mea-
b . d 2 sures may e summar1se as : 
(a) measures to reduce the importance of a given external source of 
supply : 
- encourage indigenous production, exploration, and development 
- diversification of imports 
- development of SNG 
(b) measures to mitigate the short term effects of an interruption: 
- interruptible contracts 
- storage (gas or substitutes> 
- interconnection of transport networks 
- spare production capacity. 
In its latest report 3 .on Community natural gas supplies the Commisssion 
gave a forecast of Community natural gas supplies for 1990. The pattern 
of this forecast is given in Table 6. According to this forecast the to-
tal natural gas consumption in the Community <= EUR 10> will be 273 
milliard cubic metres in 1990 <compared with 202,4 milliard cubic metres 
- - --. ·-- ---- - - -
in 1982>, of which 56% will be accounted for by indigenous production 
(compared with 72 X indigenous NG-production in 1982). Taking into 
account the contracts already agreed or assumed to be agreed the next 
·years between the respective Member States and the main third-country-
suppliers (namely USSR, Norway, Algeria and Libya) the forecast in 
Table 6 also provides the respective figures of the estimated imports 
from third countries. According to this forecast NG imports from third 
countries will reachan8 %-share of total EC-Energy consumption in 1990 
(compared with 5% in 1982). 
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35. Any discussion of the politic.s of gas must stc;,·: ~oith the factors 
wh1ch make it a des~rable commodity. Some of these will by new t~ cLear: 
gas is abundant and versatile, and, historically, it has been comparatively 
cheac. It can be a substitute for oil; its combustion is easy to control and 
1t ap;ears to irvolve few environmental hazarcs. 
36. To these may be added certain points connected with the geographical 
distr~bution of world gas reserves. Unlike oil reserves, these are not heavily 
:c~ce~t~ated in one, politicaLLy sensitive region. Indeed the distribution of 
gas reserves does not invariably coincide with that of oil reserves. 
(; i ) Absence of a true international market 
--------------------------------------
37. These are the advantages, and they are very real ones. However, the 
development of a true international market in gas is not yet complete. Indeed, 
it i~ st1Ll an open question whether there really coulo be a world gas market 
analogous to those existing in other commodities. This is because of the soecial 
problems invol~ed in moving gas from the procucer to tne consumer. 
38. Foremost among these is the need to invest heavily in a large amount 
of fixed plant and equipment. The need to fino the money for this initial 
~nvest~ent creates o~e set of problems, and the need to amortize the investment 
by long-term supply contracts creates another, especially since this question 
1s bound up with that of pricing. Again, solving the price problem is not made 
a~y easier by the absence of a free market in this commodity, and so the 
s~t~ation complicates itself still further. 
39. ~he growth of a world market is helped by the development trade in LNG. The 
rec·oient coun~r) only has to have suitable port instal~at1ons, l~nkeo :o its 
distribution network, and 1t can buy gas from any source, at least in theory. 
This promotes flexibility. However, the investment in 1nfrastructure 1n the 
~upply~ng country can be very great, and a return must be assured. 
40. LNG trade 1s one of the few aspects of the gas business to have gi~en ris~ to 
m;s~;v·~gs :~ e~~,~cn~e~ta~ grounds, because of the risk of explos1on. Although 
crecaut~ons are rp~es~c~y ~gainst this risk, it shoula not be aL.oweo to halt 
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41. In the opinion of the rapporteur, forecasts of gas supply and demand 
in the Community between now and the end of the century should be treated with 
great caution. The advantages of gas are real enough, but if oil prices remain 
comparatively soft, or decline still further, it is questionable whether there 
will be sufficient enthusiasm for sh~uldering the-heavy investment burden of 
creating new gas tr~~s~o~t and distribution infrastructure to sustain a sign4fica 
rate of increase in gas consumption in the industrialised countries, which are 
the main consumers. 
42. At the same time the naturat desire of the developing countries 
which possess natural gas reserves to exploit a potential for~ign currency 
earner will tend towards an increase in available world supplies. 
43. very recently the OPEC Bulletin published an article entitled "Why 
the world gas trade is in the doldrums", which pointed out that "the global tradf 
in gas last year accounted for only 165 m toe, or a mere 12% of consumption, 
failing to meet by a large margin the expansionary projects made for 
its interregional prospects just a few years ago"1• This indicates that demand 
has been lower than anticipated, which in turn implies that supply requirements 
may have been overstated. 
report by a research body 
possibility of a gas glut 
This inference is supported by an even more recent 
which predicts that western Europe faces the 
in the near future2• 
44. The medium-term situation has recently been transformed by a change 
of policy in the Netherlands.· In July 1983 Gasunie said it was in favour of 
concluding new export contracts for natural gas. In September, in its 
memorandum on the 1984 Budget, the Dutch government made the change of policy 
official. This means that, contrary to expectation, gas from the Groningen 
field will be available to help meet European demand after 19903• 
45. Gas supply contracts commonly run for long periods: decades rather 
than years. It would be ironical if European countries, impelled by a desire 
to loosen the ties of dependence on oil and thus achieve greater flexibility 
in energy matters, got locked into unrealistic gas upply contracts with third 
countries on the basis of unnecessarily pessimistic forecasts of the supply 
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and demand situation. Yet it could be argued that this has already 
happened in some cases. 
46. It is one of the contentions of the present report that this type of 
consideration is, in many practical instances, more important than some of the 
broader-range factors which sometimes claim attention in discussion of the 
politics of gas. 
~~. A major political problem arising from the Community's indigenous 
production Clargely concentrated in the Netherlands and in the North Sea) 
's the problem of depletion policy, with its corollary: the need to strike 
a balance between indigenous production and foreign imports. 
48. Since not all Member States of the Community are equally involved in 
the production of natural gas, their intere~s do not all fall along the same 
oerspective. In rough terms, the Netherlands accounts for about half of the 
EC production and the U.K. for another quarter. 
49. It has hitherto been the policy of the Dutch government to husband the 
~emaining resources in the enormous Groningen field and to treat them as a 
strategic reserve. This implied that no further export contracts to the rest 
of the Community would be signed. As noted above, this policy appears to be 
changing. However, this does not mean that the Netherlands is weakening in 
its resolve to use gas in an economically prudent way. 
50. Other elements of this approach have included an insistence on realistic 
~ricing and an emphasis, as regards domestic consumption on the use of gas for 
P~~ooses for which it is a particularly sutitable energy source (premium uses) 
rather than as a fuel for electricity generation. 
51. Turning to the exploitation of the natural gas resources of the United 
Kingdom in the North Sea, one sees the importance for gas policy of the nature 
of the relationship between a national government and a national gas 
undertaking, especial~y in regard to such matters as taxation, pricing, tne 
share of the orivate sector and the management of resources. 
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52. The British Gas Corporation has been obliged by the UK Government to 
raise prices to consumers in the interests of "realistic" pricing. However, 
in view of the scope for intervention by the Government in the economics of 
BGC, the mataphysics of this concept could be described as somewhat tortuous. 
53. If the Government has the power to impose a levy on BGC's profits (which 
la~financial year exceeded those of ICI, Beecham and Marks and Spencer 
combined1> and to order the disposal of its oil assets, as well as to make 
or break the Corporation's monopoly of gas supply, what is there left that 
is "realistic" about BGC's position in the market? 
54. One reality which BGC does have to face is that, while it has recently 
been able to make large profits on its gas from the southern North Sea, it 
will in future have to pay considerably more for its gas - either in the 
form of higher extra~tion costs further north in the North Sea, or of imports 
from Norway~ 
55. These comments are not so much intended as criticisms of the Member State 
in question as indications of the difficulty of securing, or even identifying 
"real" market conditions in gas. 
56. A causal chain links all the following: reserves, rate of depletion, 
price. How this chain ties up with major energy parameters is well expessed 
in the following quotation: 
" Virtually every major energy policy decision in the UK depends on 
assumptions about oil and gas reserves -nuclear policy, support 
for the coal industry, oil and gas depletion policy, attitudes to 
the establishment in the UK of energy intensive industries."2 
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2Lehmann and Shaw, "British gas buying rights and natural gas depletion", 
Energy Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 1982, pp 57-61 
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(v) Pol1:· ·' -~ .... ~:;t!!f'll~ .., .. ~--:-•'?d w;th import..~-· ..... ties 
---------------------------------·-------------------
57. ihe ma~n pcL1•ical problems associated with importing natural gas fro~ 
c~tside the Community are generally regarded as those of over-dependence on 
a s· .gLe suppli~r, and of security of supply. However, these are not the 
~r.Ly problems. As has already been indicated, there is a secondary range 
of ~~oblems associated with the actual conclusion of supply contracts. 
Inoeeo, =nee the primary problems ot over-dependence and security are solved, 
~h~ secondary ones move into the first rank. 
sa. For example, many of the arguments now being used by critics of the 
Soviet gas deaL concern the terms of the deal itself, rather than macro-
political issues. 
59. The critics say that the contracts with the Soviet Union signed in 
1981, before the current downward trends in inflation rates and oil prices, 
provide for a steady rate of increase in the price to be paid for the 
Siberian gas up to the end of the century. It is alleged that the current 
pri:e of gas under the contract is S34 against a current oil price of 1291• 
60. Then there is the question of the equipment supplied by European 
companies for building the Urengoi pipeline. The critics say the Soviet 
Union used its monopsonist position to beat the suppliers down to a minimum 
price, then "paid" for the goods with European credits which will be repaid 
out of the inflated revenues accruing from the unrealistic gas supply 
contracts. 
61. Such criticisms should be treated with reserve insofar as they emanate 
from the sources responsible for the more alarmist and controversial 
macropolitical objections to the Siberian pipeline deal. 
62. The other side of the coin is that the Soviet Union is believed in 
the West to have had to accept a considerably lower price for the Siberian 
gas than it originally wished for because of the vital role of the agreement 
in its overall gas plans2• 
63. Morecver it is important to keep a sense of proportion over the Siberian 
gas project. In the first place, since it is clear that the Ten cannot meet 
future demand from their own reserves, the Community should be glad to have 
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2wall Street Jour~al, 8 and 16 December 1983 Wioncze: and ::er-ato, "Tbe Present and Future of Natural Gas", OPEC Review, 
Vol. v:. ~o. 3, A~tumn ~982, p276 
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this abundant new source of supply, always provided that it is treated 
as one source among several. 
64. Generous praise should also be given to all those responsible for 
the technical achievement which the pipeline represents. The first gas 
from the Siberian fields crossed the Czechoslovak-German frontier on 
1 January 1984, from where it was to be sent on by Ruhrgas to France1• This 
is a matter for congratulations, even though the pipeline is not yet complete. 
When it is complete, it will be 4.500 kilometres Long. 
65. The other major Long-distance gas pipeline to Europe completed in recent 
years is the Transmed pipeline carrying gas from Algeria, via Tunisia, to 
Sicily and mainland Italy. This pipeline is a major technical achievement 
not only on account of its Length <2.400 kms>, but also because it includes 
a major undersea section attaining a maximum depth of 600 metres. 
66. (At the same time it is important to realise that even the installation 
of local distribution networks can represent major engineering projects. For 
instance, the new transmission and distribution system for the supply of 
natural gas to the island of Funen in Denmark will require the installation 
of more than 2.000 km of piping. This is part of a plan to supply the whole 
of Denmark with natural gas from the Danish sector of the North Sea.>2' 3 
67. Algeria, with the Soviet Union and Norway, is one of the most important 
suppliers of natural gas to the EC. Here too there is a danger of overstating 
the issues of over-dependence and security, at the expense of contract and 
pricing questions. Two of Algeria's Largest clients are France and Italy. 
68. Italy has an urgent need to curb its reliance on imported oil, coupled 
with a relative Lack of other energy options. These factors have caused 
Italy's energy planners to aim for a 40% increase in gas consumption between 
1982 and 1990. 
69. Many informed observers believe that the price which Italy agreed to 
pay Algeria for gas through the Transmed pipeline was a high one. However, 
if this is so, some of the main causes did not arise from Italy's general 
energy situation, but from special factor~. 
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3rhe Transmed and Funen projects a~examples of infrastructure schemes 
which have benefited from financebythe European Investment Bank 
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70. ~ne ~iS tGe +--• t~at Italy harl •~~an o~ ·~a whole burder of ~~~:-::-: 
""";£ ..:,::.~,.~-:: •. lhe:-"~·cr~ w~en, 1n ·.·~~a, •~th t·.~.: p~oeline r.earir;~ :ompletion, 
Scna: :acn insisted o~ an upward renego~ia~1on ~f the gas price originally 
~~reed, lraly was ~ared w1th the prcs~e~ cf m ~uge interest b~rden on an 
~nusec pi;el~re until it nanaged ·: st·1ke a n~w oeal. 
-.
1 M;,:s::while Algeria was also nEgct-"at-.ng w:th Belgium and France. There 
";, ~~ need to sit in judgment on the two Membe· State governments involved 
for reaching the agreements with Algeria which were finally concluded, since 
they were ac:ing witn1n the constraints of their respective economic and 
poL~tical situations. :t is widely understood, however, that the prices 
which they accepted served to weaken the arguments being used by the Italians 
in cefence of their own position. 
72. Thus as well as the problems of over-depende~ce and security, other 
political issues complicate the conclusion of ~as supply contract with third 
co~ntries. These include: 
(a) Bilateral relations between the buyer and seller countries in 
non-gas domains <e.g. general trade policy); 
(b) Competiti0n, or at best lack of coordination, between EC Member 
States seeking supplies; 
(c) Issues relating to the sale of equipment and services necessary 
for the construction of gas transport facilities; 
<d) Issues relating to the finance of transport facilities; 
(e) Any decision by a government involved to make the contract 
serve a political purpose beyond that of simply obtaining gas; 
(f) Miscellaneous, contingent factors affecting price negotiations. 
73. The importance of Norwegian gas supplies, now and in the future, must be 
stressed. These are of mutual benefit since they promote the EC's diversity 
of supply, while offeri~g Norway a large and accessible market for its gas, 
which might not be so conveniently disposed of to other purchasers. 
74. To the extent that production in the northern areas of the North Sea 
involves technical diffic~lties and thus higher costs, Norwegian gas will not 
be cheap. The argument for paying a "security" premium for Nowegian gas is, 
however, not proven, g1ver. that gas ~rom other sources can hardly be said to 
be sold at a discount. 
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75. Because of the abnormal market situation, there is a major question as to 
what philosophy should guide the setting of prices in contracts between producers 
and consumers, including the bi~ national gas undertakings, as well as the level 
of tariffs set by the distributors for their customers. 
76. Another question is what criteria should determine· the level of the 
charges demanded by transport and distribution undertakings for those specific 
servi~es, especially when transport across intra-C~nity frontiers is involved. 
11. There is a strong body of opinion which holds that the price of gas should 
fully reflect the costs of exploration, development and production as well as 
depreciation on what is unquestionably a dwindling resource. This attitude is 
justified by natural prudence and also by the political desirability of 
establishing objective criteria for the setting of ~as prices so·as to avoid 
distortion of the terms of trade in the co1111110n market by the application o.f prices 
so low as to amount to indirect subsidies. 
78. On the other hand, a n~w dimension of the problem is opened up when one starts 
to consider the influence of the oil price on gas prices and tariffs. When oil 
prices are rising, one sees a tendency for producers to clai• that the price of 
gas should rise to c-omparable levels. Thh undermines any attempt by the iiiPOrter 
side to counteract the inflationary effec~s of high oH prices by encouraging 
industrial and other consumers to switch from oil to gas. 
79. When oil prices are falling, this will tend to undermine the att.-pt to tie the 
price of gas to the objective criteria mentioned above, namely production costs 
and depreciation. 
80. It is the strategy of the Co111111ission to work towards, not a·~ar.onisation Gf 
gas prices and tariffs in the Community, which would not in any case be a feasible 
obje~}ive in the feasible for.seeablre ~ut.ure, but;. .cerh-4n cOtRPar.t»itity in gas 
prices which, could be acMeved by an improvet~tent in the ti"a_nsparency of gas ·pricing 
structures, as well as by the establishment of standard criteria for the foraation 
of .frice~_!!l-2_ tar if.!~·--·· .. .., ... 
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81. The fact that the market for natural gas is limited to a certain 
comparatively small number of countries means that in principle these 
countries are in a position of bargaining strength when it comes to 
negotiating with potential suppliers, although much depends on the opportunity 
that a third-country supplier may or may not have to play one potential 
customer off against the other. 
82. A measure of coordination among European Community purchasers is 
achieved by the for~ation of consortia of continental undertakings to ryegotiate 
with the various outside. suppliers. It should be. noted that the larges~ 
organisations buying gas in the Community are Ruhrgas and the British gas 
Corporation. 
83. There is no such thing as a consortium grouping all ten Member States. 
84. As far as tariffs to final cc!"sumers ar.e concerned, the prime need is 
for greater transparency1 bpth as regards the tariffs themselves a;nd the 
procedures and criter.ia which govern the levels at w.hich. they are .filCed. 
85. There is also a need for more information about the impact of the taxation 
policies of the various Member States on their domestic markets, and about 
subsidies, whether overt or implicit. These are matters which the Commission 
should continue to study within the terms of the relevant Articl.es Qf the. ~EC 
Treaty. 
IV. fQ~fb~~!Q~ 
86. The Commission, in its recent Communication~has successfully analysed 
many of ttle major issues of European Commynity gas policy, and has identified 
the appropri~te strategies, particularly as regarCfs the probl.ems of over-
dependence on sources of external supply and of security of supply. 
87. However, the Commission has .not yet gone far enough in r~commen~ing 
meas.-ures t9 ,bring.,about gre~t~r. coordination of the activities of Member S.tate 
' ' ' . .. 
governments an.d gas und~rtakiq~s in the inte.re.sts ,of th~ :Comntunity as a wtJole. 
88. · Thi-s is the next step. It must go hand in hand wi.th .a ri.~o'=ous. ins.istence 
on the application of rules laid down by the Treaties in sucb areas as, for 
. '· . 
example, competition rules, tax provisions, free movement and social policy. 
-26-
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v. THE COMMISSION COMMUNICATION OF MARCH 1984 
------------------------------------------
89. WM le th~ p~esent r'eport was in the process of being considered by the 
Conimittee on Energy, Research and Technology, the Commission complet-ed a 
new communication concerni~g natura~ gas1• This was a follow-up to 
the Communication of 15 October 1982 on Community natural gas supplies. · 
90. The new communication. examines the likely situation in '1990 and 2000 as 
regards <a> supply and demand and (b) security of supplies, with certain 
observations on the integration of the Community's natural gas market. 
91. Consumption forecasts for 1990 have again been revised downwards. 
Since current supply contracts with Algeria, the USSR and Norway were 
concluded when demand predictions were higher, the Community's needs for 
1990 are more than covered. The Commission predicts that in that year 
shares of total Community gas supplies for the main external sources will 
be as follows: USSR 19%, Norway 14% and Algeria 10%. The figure for 
the USSR will represent 4.5% of total energy supplies. 
92. The Commission reports• that the security outlook for 1990 has improved 
and is in line with the target whereby the gas industry should be able to 
cope with an interruption of 25% of total gas supplies from outside the 
EEC. 
93. Looking ahead to 2000, the Commission says that by then additional 
imports will be needed- between 20 and 55 mteo, according to the basis of 
calculation. The figure would in any case be somewhat lower if there was 
a cross-channeL pipel.ine-.in existence. By the end of the decade, the 
Commission sees an important r&le for supplies from Holland, the United 
Kingdom and the Norwegian Sleipner field. It attaches importance in 
the slightly longer term to the Norwegian Troll field. 
94. With· reference to all these possibilities the Commission stresses the 
need to make decisions soon on development of the respective fields, so 
that the Community is rot left in a position bf' suddenly htving to-! ta~e, i~s 
supplies from whatever source happens to be available at the time. 
95. With regard to suppli~s from the Unit~d Kingdom, it is r~levant to 
note that the Department of Energy r~cently announced that 1983 was the 
U.K.'s b~st y~ar for offshor~ oil and gas discoveries since the r~cord 
-v-
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'· 
year, 1975. In 1983 there were 21 significant oil and gas discoveries 
(including 10 gas>, against 21 in 19751• 
96. The Com11h1ion also stresses the need for increased cross-border 
cooperat;on in the Community with regard to stocks and transport, particularly 
after 1990 when the need for imports becomes greater. Again, the need 
for early plans and decisions is clear. 
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3 1) ~3~c 3: ~ORLD PRODUCTION - NATURAL GAS • <billion of m (150 C, 1013 mtar) 
1970 1973 1979 
•o rld <without China> 1052,6. 1252,2 1492,7 
Africa 3,5 10,2 29,6 
<0,3) <0,8) <2,0) 
Ameria 713,3 759,4 716,2 
(67,8) (60,6) (48,0) 
- United States 620,7 643,6 579,7 
(59,0> (51,4) <38,8) 
- Canada 56,8 75,1 73,4 
(5,4) <6,0) <4,9) 
ts'a (without China) 25,9 51,8 74,3 I 
I <2,5> I (4,1) <5,0) i 
').:eanu 1,6 4,4 9,3 
(1 ,5> <0,4) (6,2) 
Europe 308,3 426,4 663,3 
C29,3> (34,0) (44,4) 
• EUR 10 77,7 146,9 179,9 
<7,4) (11,7) (12,2> 
- FR of Germany 13,4 20,5 20,0 
- France 6,9 7,7 7,8 
- Italy 13,2 15,4 13,5 
- Netherlands 33,3 74,7 98,8 




- Rest of Europe 230,6 279,5 483,4 
<21,9) (22,3> <32,4> 
- USSR 191,9 236,3 407,0 
(18,2> (18,9) <27 ,3> 
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Source: EUROSTAT and own calculations 
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'in brackets: percentage part of total world production 
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27,6 17,4 11,4 
25,9 16,1 11,0 
20,6 I 13,5 9,9 20,2 13,8 9,8 
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NL B l UK IRL OK GR 
--- -----·-
-32,0 8,2 0,3 9,6 
- - -
-25,1 7,0 0,3 8,2 
- - -
n.c. 22,9 9,7 n.c. 0,0 0,0 0,0 
n.c. 19,7 8,3 n.c. 0,0 0,0 0,0 
____ _) 
Table 4: EC-Energy Balance-Sheet, production, consumption and net imports (Mtoe> 
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EUR 9 0 F 1 NL 
327,9 122~ 1 46,8 22,9 29,3 
480,1 124,9 55,3 18,2 63,8 
486,0 124,7 55,3 19,9 55,6 
61,0 10,1 5,9 11,0 24,4 
125,1 14,5 6,0 11,5 .S0,9 
114,2 12,6 5,5 12,0 52,5 
18,7 8,2 12,7 48,1 83,3 
26,2 11,5 10,9 63,4 95,5 
23,5 10,1 9,9 60,3 94,4 
829,8 237,0 149,9 112,0 48,5 
895,0 257,8 180,5 130,4 60,7 
857,0 244,6 173,4 126,7 55,7 
61,6 12,9 8,4 10,8 15,7 
165,8 42,5 21,9 21,9 28,9 
155,7 38,4 21,2 21,9 27,4 
7,4 5,4 5,6 9,6 32,4 
18,4 16,2 12,0 17,0 47,2 
18,2 15,7 12,2 17,3 49,2 
432,2 134,3 129,2 115,4 3,6 
398,7 128,5 116,3 111,7 7,9 
B L UK lRL OK GR 
7,3 0,0 98,0 1,2 0,0 
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40,7 4,6 211,4 5,9 19,7 -
43,3 3,2 194,4 8,0 16,8 14,8 
41,4 3,0 187,6 7,9 16,8 15,2 
3,5 0,0 10,4 
- - -
8,2 0,3 40,8 1,1 
- -
6,8 0,3 38,2 t,6 
- -
8,5 0,2 4,9 
- - -
19,1 9,3 21,2 13,6 - - I 16,4 10,0 20,4 20,3 - -
i 
35,8 3,1 -12,6 5,8 17,4 12,2 
35,() 3,6 ,-25,2 5,4 15,5 10,8 
:J 
0 
TABLE 5 EC C= EUR 10> Gas fco•l'lmy indicators 
----------------------------·--------------------r-----------------.---------·--------~----------------, 
Share of the different types of gas in consumption 
of the inland marKet (in X> 
- natural gas 
- coke-over gas 
- Blast-furnace gas 
- Works gas 
All gases 
Share of principal sectors in natural gas 
consumption {in %) 
- non energy consumption 
- Electrical power stations 
- Industry 
- Households etc. 
- Other sectors 
Total all sectors 
Share of natural gas consumption accounted 
for by (in X> 
- Indigenous gas 
among which Netherlands gas 
- Imported gas from third countries 














































































































~ (1) Based on forecasts for importers 
~ (2) Contract not yet Government approved 
Estimated Imports from Third Countries 
Total Algeria Libya Norway USSR 
28.0 - - 8.0 20.0 
33.3 9.2 - 2.9 12.0 
31.2 13.0 2.6 2 - 7.0<8.0) 
2.0 - - 2.0 -
8.4 5.0 - 2.9 <0.5)3 
- - - - -
16.5 - - 16.5 -
- - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - -
"' 3 
119.4 27.2 2.6 32.3 39.o<8.sS 
~ (3) Under negotiation. Quantity given would be the estimated take in 1990. 
109 m3 Groningen 
---
Natural Gas Imports 
from Third Countries as : 
X of Total X of Naturd4 
















Notes(iJhe sum of the imports given by source country is t~ot necessarily equal to total imports as the source of some supplies 
-- is not yet settled. 
(ii)Forecasts based on expert group work. Not necessarily official Member State forecasts. 
-'• 
::::1 
. Source : COM(82) 653 final 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-653/82) 
tabled by Mr PURVIS and Mr SELIGMAN 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on a Natural Gas Policy in the European Community 
The European Parliament, 
ANNEX 2 
A. recalling its motion for resolution of 18 February 1982 appealing to the Council 
and Commission to make rapid and energetic efforts to draw up •nd implement 1 common 
energy policy for natural gas supplies, such that Soviet supplies of natural gas would 
not endanger Community independence and security, 
a. mindful that the Soviet Union interrupted energy supplies for political purposes to 
Yugoslavia in 1948, to Finland in 1958, to Albania in 1961, to China in 1962, to Ghana 
in 1965 and to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1981, 
c. noting that the latest forecasts for the Community's imports of natural gas and oil in 
1990 suggest a dependence of 54X, 58% if imported coal is included, campared with the 
agreed target of SO% for all imported energy, contained in the Community's 1990 Energy 
Objectives, 
o. considering that the price and supply of energy has dominated issues such as inflation 
and the level of economic activity for the past decade, 
E. concerned that the Community's economy in the coming decades should be less susceptible 
to increases in the price of energy which have little or no relation to market conditions, 
F. aware of the current negotiations between gas undertakings in Belgium, Italy and Spain 
and the Soviet agency, Soyuzgasexport, 
G in the light of the Community's expected dependence on the Soviet Union for 4SX of total 
imports of natural gas in 1990, 
H. stressing the benefits to fair industrial competition within the Community and to compet-
itiveness with third countries of having ample supplies and the lowest possible common 
pricing of natural gas throughout the European Community, 
1. Emphasises the need for the Communityto•ake its own efforts to obtain reliable energy 
suoolies at tolerable prices, such that they are approximately uniform and do not lead 
to distortions in industrial competitiveness within the Community and vis-a-vis third 
countries; 
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' 
Draws attention to the dangers to the Community's economy of growing dependence on 
.... ,~tMu.r.~l. gas imports as well as oil, especially if these sources are not adequately 
diver~ if ie.d; 
'· Expresses concern at t~e strategic and political implications of excessive reliance on 
any single source of natural ~as supply; 
•• Views with alarm the risk that in the coming years the world market in natural gas may 
replicate that of oil in the past decade; 
). Believes therefore that a policy of diversification of sources of supply of natural gas 
is essential to protect Europe from accidental or intentional interrruptions; 
~. Calls upon national gas undertakings, governments and the Commission in conjuction with 
the private sector oil and gas companies, to show determination in securing immediately 
diversified souces of supply for natural gas; 
7. Calls for the creation of adequate buffer stocks, controlled within the Community, to 
absorb any short term difficulties; 
8. Requests the Commission to submit a report to Parliament and Council on immediate, medium 
and long term measures to enhance the security of the Community's natural gas supplies, 
having regard to projections of likely demand,.source of supply, relative cost and reliab-
ility; 
9. Requests a technical and economic report on the following potential projects: 
a> a European natural gas grid linking all Member States and supplied interchangeably 
from the northern North Sea, the Soviet Union, Middle East;-No-rth--Africa an-d--West -
Africa 
b) the use of southern North Sea gas fields as replenishable reservoirs 
c> arrangements with the ACP states for the extraction, production and transport of 
natural gas 
d) further development of industrial processes for coal gasification within the 
Community and accessible ACP states which have substantial coal reserves; 
10. Requests a political assessment of the suggested projects; 
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1. Calls for proposals regarding the involveunt of the. p.riva.te and pubH.c ~~tors in. 
reco.-ended schemes with th•ir respective aanageaent and financial roitSi 
2. Requests its President to forward this Resolution to Co.aission and Council for urgent 
attention and action. 
(''. 
\. .. · 




of the Carmittee a1 Econanic and M:x'letaey Affairs 
Q'l 
the motioo for a resolution, tabled pursuant to Ru1e 47 of the 
Rules of Procedure, on a natural gas policy in the Eurcp!an 
Community (Doc. 1-653/82) 
Draftsman : Mr. F. HERMAN 
On 20 Octob~r 1982, the Co.mittee on Econoaic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr HERMAN draftsman of the opinion. 
The committ~e consider~d the draft opinion at its meeting of 
18 January 1983 and unanimously adopted the conclusions at that aeeting. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Hopper, acting chairman; 
Mr Macario, vice-chairman; Mr Herman, draftsman; Mr Beuaer.<deputizing for 
Mr Collomb>, Mr von Bismarck, Mr Oelorozoy, Mr Leonardi, Mr Papantoniou, 
Mr Purvis <deputizing for Sir Brandon Rhys Williams>, Mr Rogers, Mr Wagner 
and Mr Wedekind <deputizing for Mr von Wogau). 
. . 
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I. Trends in reserves and world consumption 
1. ln 1980, the known world reserves of natural QIS were 78 billion cubic 
metres, i.e. 52 times annual consumption (1.5. billion cubic metres> • 
These 52 years of gas reserves compare with 30 years of reserves for 
oil. 
The substantial increase in reserves <which doubled between 1970 and 
1980> is due to the prospecting carried out in recent years and the 
development of new techniques like those for deep-sea drilling and 
transportation in hostile environments such as the Arctic regions. 
Further prospecting, encouragedbythe prices currently offered for 
natural gas, will make it possible to maintain a rate of discovery 
above that of consumption over the next few years, and thus to increase C: 
the number of years of reserves. Experts estimate the ultimate 
reserves of natural g~s (i.e. the sum of know~probable and possible 
reserves) at 3 to 4 times the known reserves. 
11. Location of reserves, production and consumption of natural gas 
2. A breakdown of known gas reserves between the various parts of the 
world reveals the size of the reserves situated in the USSR and the 
Middle East. In comparison with oil reserves, it can also be seen 
that gas resources are more widely distributed in geographical terms. 
The shift of prospectingactivities towards the polar regions will 
improve this geographical spread still further. 
A breakdown of natural gas production and consumption by country 
shows that: 
- the United States and the USSR are the world's leading producers 
and also the largest consumers of gas; 
- Western Europe produces 0.192 billion cubic metres per year (131 
of world output) and consumes 0.22 billion cubic metres <151 of 
world gas consumption>. 
Natural gas currently accounts for·19X of the primary energy consumed 
in the world and 1SX of that consumed in W~stern Europe. 
- 40 - PE 82.193/fin. 
c 
111. International trade 
C~rrent position 
3. Of the 1.5 billion cubic •etres consumed in the world in 1980, only 
0.19 billion (13X) derived fro• international trade; the reMaining 
87X vas produced fro• domestic sources. 84X of the gas traded vas 
·conveyed by pipeline and 16X in liquid for• (LNG). 
A ranking of countries on the basis of the quantities of gas i•ported 
and exported in 1980 shows that: 
- the USSR is the leading exporter of gas, followed by the Netherlands; 
-the United States, although the leadinggasproducer, is also the 
second-ranking importer because of the scale of domestic de•and. 
The main reasons for the still relatively small proportion of inter-
national trade are: 
- the broad geographical distribution of reserves and hence the 
retative proximity of current production centres to centres of 
consumption; 
- the fact that the two largest producer countries (the USA and 
the USSR) are also the largest consumers. 
Prospects 
4. In the coming years, the part played by international trade in •eeting 
the demand for gas will increase significantly through the interplay 
of the following considerations: 
the continuing rise in demand __ for_~~ because of its advantages 
over other fuels; 
- the fact that t!'\is future demand wH_Lbe...mtt increasingly by iiiC)orts 
of gas from distant regions, because: 
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- the reserves there are plentiful, 
- the policy factors concerning the security of supplies are promp-
ting the consumer countries to diversify their supply sources and 
to conserve domestic reserves or those situated in neighbouring 
countries, 
- the technology for exploiting deposits and transportation is con-
stantly being improved <techniques for deep-sea drilling, production 
and transportation, LNG technology, transport by pipeline in Arctic 
regions, etc.>. 
5. The majority of experts agree that international trade in natural gas 
can be expected to double in volume over the next ten years from 
0.19 billion cubic metres in 1980 to around 0.38 billion in 1990. 
This trade would then account for 20% of a total gas consumption of 
1.9 billion cubic metres. Trade in the form of L~G sales would 
undergo a proportionately far greater increase, from 0.03 billion 
cubic metres (gas equivalent) in 1980 to 0.14 billion in 1990. 
The reasons for this anticipated growth of trade in LNG are: 
- the improvements-made. in techniques for producing and transporting 
LNG <especially via the economy of scae>; 
- the fact that transportation of LNG by tanker provides a direct 
link between producer and consumer states, without third coutnries 
having to be crossed; 
- the fact that transportation costs are lower than by pipeline over 
longer distances and for small or moderate quantities. 
IV. Conclusions 
6. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: 
<a> supports the resolution insofar as it requests the Commission 
and the Council to formulate a common.natural gas policy; 
(b) considers, that in the long term, the outlook for natural gas 
prices is brighter than for oil prices, in that the ratio of 
reserves to consumption is better and the market far mort 
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limited, requiring massive investment (pipelines and gasification) 
and consumption on an extremely large scale <the market is in 
fact restricted to Europe, Japan and the USA>; 
considers gas to be a fuel with much more attractive properties 
than oil in that it is markedly less pollutive; 
<c> although recital G is not in line with the facts <the dependence 
of 4SX in 1990 is on imports as a whole and not on the USSR 
alone>, believes that the possible increase in our level of 
dependence calls for special endeavours in terms of: 
- prospecting for new deposits on European territory and nearby, 
in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, 
- the diversification of sources, which are at present too 
greatly restricted to Algeria and the USSR, 
- storage capacity, 
- link-ups in the network; 
(d) considers that the potential of the North Sea has by no means 
been fully exploited and sees no reason for the Commission not 
to enter into negotiations with Norway and the United Kingdom 
with a view to stepping up prospecting and exploitation and, 
in any event, removing the legal, administrative-and fiscal 
barriers to further exploration. 
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of the Committee on Transport 
on 
the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PURVIS and Mr SELIGMAN 
on a natural gas policy in the European Community <Doc. 1-653/82>. 
Draftsman: Mr J. MOORHOUSE 
On 26 January 1983 the Committee on Transport appointed Mr MOORHOUSE 
draftsaan of an opinion on the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr PURVIS 
and Mr SELIGMAN on a natural gas policy in the European Community (Doc. 1-653/82>. 
The committee considered the subject of the draft opinion at its meeting of 
17 February 1983, and the draft opinion itself at its meetings of 26 April and 
26 May 1983. At the latter meeting the committee adopted the draft opinion by 
15 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: 
Mr SEEFELD, chairman; Dame Shelagh ROBERTS, vice-chairman; Mr MOORHOUSE, 
draftsman; Mrs von ALEMANN, Mr SAUDIS, Mr GABERT, Mr HOFFMANN, Mr JANSSEN van 
RAAY, Mr KEY, Mr KLINKENBORG, Mr LAGAKOS, Mr LOO (deputizing for Mr ALBERS>, 
Mr MARSHALL, Mr MARTIN, Mr MORELAND, Mr SKOVMAND and Mr VANDEWIELE. 
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Transport and natural gas 
1. The •otion for a resolution tabled by Mr PURVIS and Mr SELIGMAN 
<Doc.1-653/82> draws attention to the Community's expected dependence 
on the Sovi@t Uhion for 45% of total imports o1 natural gas in 1990, 
and expresses concern at the strategic and political implications of 
excessive reliance by the Member States on any such single source of 
natural gas supply. 
2. Although your draftsman fully shares this concern, th~ specific ai• of 
this opinion will be to consider the suggestion for a Community natural 
gas policy at the level of transportation, in particular pipelines. 
It will be for other, more directly competent committe~s of the Euro-
pean Parliament to examine the foreign policy and energy policy implica-
tions of the current situation on the natural gas market. 
3. The importance of transportation to the Community's fundamental objec-
,. 
tive of enhancing the security of natural gas supplie~ was recognized 
by the Council of Energy Ministers at its meeting of 9 November 1982. 
On this occasion the Council called upon the Commission, "in cooperation 
with Member States' representatives and assisted as necessary by experts 
from the gas inaustry, to assess the possibilities for further collabora-
tion between the Member States; in particular, stuaies will be made of 
2 the adequacy of the natural gas transport systems." 
4. The Commission, for its part, in its communication on Community natural 
gas supplies3, emphasized that the one physical constraint which could 
prevent improved cooperation between Member States in dealing with a 
major interruption to supplies, "is the inability of the gas transport 
system to re-allocate resources as required." 
1
cf.COM<82) 45 final - communication from the Commission to the Council 
concerning measures to enhance the security of natural gas supplies to 
the Community 
2
council press release 10786 e/82 
3
cOM(82) 653 final, p.11 
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5. Your draftsman has ascertained that both the Com.ission and 
the International Energy Agency are currently studying in detail 
the whole question of the interconnection of gas pipelines in the 
Community's Member States. He suggests that the Committee on 
Transport should reserve the right to draw up a comprehensive 
report on the Community pipeline network following the 
publication, expected by the end of this year, of t~e results 
of the work undertaken by these two organizations • 
. 6. The importance of this work was highlighted by the approach adopted 
in the abovementioned Commission communication, which describes the 
scenarios of an interruptionof10% and 25% in normal forecast 
natural gas supplies, expressed as an annual rate, f~r a six-month 
winter period in 1990, which was chosen as the reference year. In 
addition, Member States• experts were asked to examine how they could 
deal with such interruptions in both a normal and severe winter. 
The answers given by the Member States in questionnaires returned 
to the Commission indicate that the gas industry in the Community 
considers itself able 'to cope with all the scenarios examined, 
and that only certain limited peak supply problems would arise 
in some countries "in the most extreme circumstances". The table 
contained in the Commission document further indicates that even 
those countries which are most reliant on imports from outside 
the Community would be able to deal with an even more severe 
shortfall in supply than that represented by the most extreme 
scenario - such at least is the Commission•s current view. 
7. Nevertheless, as stated above, an essential pre-condition of Member 
States• ability to deal with shortfalls of the extent envisaged is 
the capacity of the gas transport system effectively to re-allocate 
resources as required. Hence the need to reinforce the Community 
grid in order to guard against the dislocation of supplies 
resulting from a major interruption. 
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"Russia No.6" - the Urengoy pipeline 
a. This 5,500 k•. lo~g pipeline will link the gas fields of western Siberia 
(Urengoy and Medvezhe) with the German-Czech border, dnd is intended to 
supply western Europe with at least 40 billion m3 of additional natural 
gas per year. The following table shows estimated supplies of Soviet 
natural gas to western Europe in 1990, as a percentage of total natural-
gas supplies and overall energy supplies: 
Natural gas Overall energy 
34% 
France 26% 4% 
Italy 35% 6% 
Netherlands 11% 4% 
Belgium 38X 9.5% 
9. It would appear that the USSR has, for technical reasons, chosen to lay 
two 1.42m- diameter pipes operating at a pressure of 45 bars, rather 
than a single one operating at 140 bars. The total :apa~ity of the 
double line is understood to be 50-70 billion m3 per year. This will 
leave a pipeline capacity of at least 10 billion m3 per year by the e'nd 
of this decade for supplies to other European countries. 1 
1 Source: International Defense Review, 1/1982, pp.15-18 
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10. The "Russia No.6" project will thus clearly play a •ajor role in 
supplying a large number of countries with pri•ary energy. 
However, there is another side of the coin. Reports indicate that, 
in addition to the political and strategic indications •entioned above, 
grounds also exist for technical reservations1 as to the viability of 
the Soviet pipeline syste•. Soviet gas reserves are scattered over a 
vast territory twenty ti•es the size of france, four-fifths being 
situated in the extreme east of the country. As the ussR has no gas 
liquefaction plants, production depends upon the pipelines operating 
properly. These, howeve~, are subject to the extr~mely harsh 
climatic conditions, including snow-storms in Siberia and sand-storms 
in Turk•enistan, which frequently hamper access for the repairing of 
defective sections or the laying of new ones. 
Your draftsman would therefore request the Commission to exa•ine, in 
the context of its next Communication on natural gas ~upplies, the 
possibility of technical problems arising in connection with the opera• 




11. Given the new situation created by the "Urengoy agreement", and the fact 
that the bulk of future EEC demand will undoubtedly be met by pipelin~ 
gas, there is a clear case for further cooperation at Community level 
with a view to improving pipeline integration and links. Your drafts-
man is aware ·that -cerhin gas-·-undertakings have expressed their reluc-
tance to be involved in a formal system of EEC pipeline interconnections, 
and would consider such a proposal as interfering with their •anagement 
responsibilities and commercial freedom of action. 2 
1.d , em 
2
see Memorandum submitted by the British Gas Corporation to the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European C9mmunities (Session 1981-82 -
15th report) 
- 48 - PE 82.193/ fin. 
12. What is required, therefore, is measures which, ~ddition to enhancing 
security of supply, also have some justification in commercial terms. 
The Commission has indicated that these two objectives could be met by 
the implementation of a project whereby Norwegian gas would be exported 
to continental customers via an overland route through the UK. Your 
draftsman would agree that such a link would be preferable to a simple 
cross-Channel pipeline between the UK and the continent, for which there 
exists at present no commercial justification. lndee~, if the aim was 
to increase capacity on an interconnected European grid, the Dutch 
Groningen field, which has an extensive infrastructure and to which aost 
Member States are already connected, represents a less costly alternative 
than the British gas fields. However, the UK landbridge linking Norway's 
fields to the continent would seem an even more advantageous solution. 
·-
13. Fortunately, a report recently published by the Norwegian Ministry of 
1 Petroleum and Energy points to the existence of significant spare 
1 
capacity in the pipelines that have been or are bein~ laid on the Nor-
wegian shelf. The report goes on to state that "the Government attaches 
importance to the fact that the gas resources in this field can contribute 
to ensuring long-term gas supplies to western Europe, provided it can be 
delivered on commercial terms." 
Following this clear and positive statement by the Norwegian Government, 
the time would seem to be ripe for the Commission to ~ive detailed con-
sideration to appropriate means of promoting the construction of a 
Norway- UK - cross-Channel pipeline. Your draftsman would add that 
both the UK Department of Energy and the British Gas Corporation have 
stated that they "would consider the possibility of ;~porting Norwegian 
gas to the UK and re-exporting part of it via a pipeline link to the 
continent."2 
Report no.40 relating to the perspectives in the petroleum activity in the 
coming years (1982-83) 
2
see abovementioned report by the House of Lords Select C~ittee on the EC, 
p.XI 
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14. As a final point relating to interconnections, the co.-ittee on Trans-
.port expresses the hope that the possibility of connecting Spain and 
Portugal to the European grid is being given due consideration within 
the context of the current accession negotiations (particularly in the 
light of a projected pipeline between Algeria and Spain> • 
15. In conclusion, the draftsman would refer to a further means of trans-
porting gas, namely in liquid form (LNG) in tankers. In particular, 
the Commission is asked to examine in its next communication on natural 
gas the safety aspects of land terminals for LNG. 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
16. In the light of the above considerations,·the CommittP.e on Transport 
invites the Committee on Energy and Research to include the following 
points in its motion for a resolution on a natural gas policy in the 
European Community: 
(i) the effectiveness of the gas pipeline network within the 
Community is a key factor in enhancing security of supply 
both for the Community as a whole and, in p~rticular, for 
those Member States whose dependence on external energy 
sources is almost total; 
(ii) every effort should be made to integrate the gas grid 
still further, with a view inter alia to facilitating 
the switching of supplies in the event of shortfall or 
major interruptions; 
(iii) in addition, given that current sources of supply would 
appear unlikely to meet demand from the 1~90s onwards, 
consideration should be given forthwith t' the development 
• 
of such alternative sources as Norway, Algeria, Canada, 
Nigeria and the Middle East <among others>; 
1
see written question no. 1799/79 on this subject by Mr ALSERS 
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